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This article deals with the conception of causation in legal discourse. 
Authors firstly examine causation in the scientific, philosophical and 
common-sense discourse. Does it make sense to use general causal terms 
when examining causality in law? We can ask whether legal causality isn´t 
only artificial construct, legal fiction of a causal relationship. Some authors 
claim that legal causation is not essentially a causation in the true common 
sense and thus only a pragmatic political decision regarding the application 
of distributive and corrective justice, and economic evaluation of benefits in 
society, others on the contrary point out that causality in law as such is equal 
to its common everyday use or even in the scientific sense. What are the 
criteria in the legal sense that lead us to judge that certain event causes harm? 
Which issues relevant to philosophical discourse may be in legal discourse 
ignored as irrelevant? The authors show the necessary connection between 
terms causality in different branches although they conclude that causality is 
pluralistic concept. The issue of this article is to find out solution for causal 
connection in particular paradigmatic cases and set up some causal formulas 
that could be used in legal practice. 
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Introduction 
This article deals with the concept of causation in legal discourse.  
Out of this reason, it first deals with the concept of causation on the level of 
science, philosophy and in a commonly used language.  When exploring 
problems of legal and moral responsibility, it is necessary to cope with the 
problems of the sense of causation, causal nexus, a cause and effect.  
Subsequently, there is a number of questions to be explored in detail.  Is the 
causation in a legal sense distinguished from the causation in science, 
everyday life, or is it understood in its metaphysical sense? Does the 
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terminological accord in the term of causation have its substantiation? Does 
it make sense to come out of some theories on general causation, when 
exploring the legal causation? Isn´t the legal causation only an artificial 
construct, which under certain conditions accepts fiction of causal relation? 
In this case, spectrums of opinions differ, while some authors claim that in 
principle the legal causation does not mean the causation in a proper sense of 
the word and therefore it only concerns pragmatic political decision-making 
(Green, 1962) on assertion of distributive and corrective justice, or efficient 
allocation of resources in society (Calabresi 1961), others hold, to the 
contrary,  that causation as such has, even in law,  its substantiation  in the 
common use of this word, i.e. in the  „common sense“ (Hart &Honoré 1985) 
or even directly in the scientific sense (Moore 2009) . Thus, what criteria in 
the legal sense of the word lead us to being able to say that from the legal 
perspective, an action, or event is a cause of harm? What questions relevant 
for the philosophical discourse can be ignored in the legal discourse as non-
essential, so that the sense of the whole institute cannot be impaired? 
The first part of this article shall refer to the fact that both 
philosophical, as well as scientific causation theories have their impact on 
legal causation.  Understanding of causation and its construct in law 
responds to the social discourse and principles of applied ethics, which are 
reflected in legislation, or judicial decisions.  Thus, the first part of this 
article will deal with theoretical approaches to causation in the scientific, 
philosophical and legal discourse.  The second part will deal with a question, 
whether it is suitable to use the institute of causal relation even in the future, 
as a key guideline in asserting legal responsibility. Some theorists, especially 
causal minimalists, who have their supporters among theorists in economic 
analysis of the tort law, therefore propose different criteria for the settlement 
of compensations for caused harm on the basis of the so-called “risk theory” 
(Fletcher 1972). However, if we want to answer the question as to whether 
the institute of a causal relation should be utilized even in the future, it is 
necessary to respond at least briefly to the following raised questions:  What 
is the function of the tort law? What is the function of causation in law? 
These questions should be briefly resolved in the second part of this article. 
In what cases the currently developed causal tests and models fail? The last 
question will be resolved in the third chapter.  The fourth part should then 
suggest a pragmatic, or conceptual approach to resolve causation, i.e such an 
approach, which could provide methodologically suitable approach to 
solving individual problematic issues of law, e.g. such as  „ovedetermination 
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Contemporary approaches to causation 
Questions about causation in the philosophical discourse occur from 
its beginning, however the opinion spectrum differs and a lot of different 
theories exist. The lack of consensus on this fundamental question persists 
and therefore uncertainty about the resultant understanding of this notion 
remains.  Unfortunately such a consensus may not be even reached.  Monist 
theories exist, which refer to the fact that there is only one type of the causal 
relation; the causal pluralists, who claim that the notion of causal relationship 
can include more various relations, however all of them fill an analogical 
abstract model, therefore it is suitable to explore them under a unifying 
criterion of causation, and the causal eliminativists (e.g. such as Russel), who 
claim that all use of the word "causation" should be replaced in a scientific 
approach with another, more suitable construct.  In law, as a practical tool for 
materialization of relations in society, a bigger number of terms appears, 
which are unified under the notion of causation.  On the basis of a pragmatic 
test of utility, it is then suitable in individual causal theories to utilize their 
capacity for action in legal order, as all of these theories have their 
limitations (Losee, 2011). 
 Basic dimensions of the conflict in understanding causation can be 
defined approximately as follows:   Is causation an ontological fact, i.e. 
independent of human mind and existing in an objective world, or is it 
merely a subjective attitude of mind to reality, i.e. is causation understood as 
epistemic relation (intellectual conception)?  In other words, do mental 
events provide a correct picture of causal relations in a real world and are 
identical with it, or do they differ from it, or is the causation reality even 
dependent upon the forming mind (Kant 1989)? Scientific knowledge points 
out that our cognition of the world in an intuitive form is often incorrect and 
different from the real world - is this also true in a causal sense?  The basic 
historical origin rather understood causation in its ontological sense.  The 
ontological basis of causation was dealt with even by Ancient Greek 
philosophers, Plato dealt with it, when Timaios claims in a dialog, that all 
what comes into existence, necessarily stems from a certain cause (Plato, 
2013) and especially Aristotle, who distinguished four kinds of cause 
(formal, material, efficient, and final cause), which must function together 
(Aristotle, 2013). 
 The turning point in understanding causality toward gnoseological 
concept is brought by the Hume´s An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding.  Hume does not find causation in the external world, but as a 
certain kind of a psychological necessity in our perception derived from 
experience and formulating itself in the principle of habit (Hume, 1910).  
Hume laid his concept of causation in two definitions, one is considered to 
be an external definition the other is an internal definition, i.e. a definition 
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which refers to the perceiving mind.  In his work, he then based causation on 
these basic points: 1. A cause and its effect must be in conjunction both 
temporally and spatially; 2. A cause must precede an effect; 3. There must be 
a permanent bond between a cause and effect, which cannot be eliminated; 4. 
The same cause is followed by the same effect and the same effect never 
comes into existence in another way than from the same cause (Hume, 
1896).  This principle is derived from experience and it is a source for the 
majority of our philosophical derivations.  The most frequently the so-called 
reductionist theories come from the Hume´s causal theory, i.e. the theories 
which do not see a real relation in causation, but only our construct and they 
refer to another essence of these relations.  The so-called regularity theories 
and the INUS theory is usually placed here, but also the counterfactual 
theory, which, however comes from the second part of the definition in 
Enquiry. 
 
Regularity theory of Causation 
The most typical theory comes from the principle of regularity, i.e. 
according to this theory the relation between an event c and an event e is a 
causal relation, if, and only if the events of the e type regularly follow after 
the c type event. A problem of these theories of regularity view of causation 
is the fact that they do not differentiate between regular succession of any 
two actions (events) and a causal connexion of two actions (events). At the 
same time this definition has difficulties in dealing with singular causal 
statements, which do not allow for generalization.  According to this 
definition „the causal relation is de facto a constant sequential conjunction“ 
(Losee, 2011, p. 29), although one event does not have to be a cause of the 
other.  According to Karl Pearson, it is not possible to say that causes 
produce their effects it is merely possible to refer to repeated sequences of 
our perception.  Thus far, he follows up with Hume, however he defines the 
causal relation specifically in a way, that any time „Whenever a sequence of 
perception D, E, F, G is invariably preceded by the perception C, or the 
perceptions C, D, E, F, G always occur in this order, that is, form a routine 
of experience, C is said to be a cause of D, E, F, G, which are then described 
as its effects“ (Pearson, 1911, p. 130). 
 
Counterfactual theory 
The counterfactual theory comes again from David Hume, however 
this time from his second definition stated in Enquiry:   „if the first object 
had not been, the second never had existed“ (Hume, 1910). The most 
eminent representative of this theory is David Lewis, who comes exactly 
from the Hume´s second definition of causation. According to him, it is more 
suitable to consider this definition as an independent starting point, not an 
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alternative theory to the theory of regular succession, as is the case in Hume.  
Therefore, it is necessary to come from the basic construction of the 
counterfactual theory, which says that „c is the cause of e, if, and only if, if c 
had not occurred, then e would not have occurred“ (Lewis, 1973, p. 557). 
Nevertheless, even this theory has a number of controversial spots.  This is 
especially problem of overdetermination and the causal pre-emption. 
 
Probability theory (Probabilistic causation) 
Some philosophers coming from the Hume´s skeptical doubt and 
after the Popper´s reference to impossibility to justify universal truthfulness 
of induction on the basis of the induction itself (Popper 2007), they rather 
incline to the method of probability than to a causal relation.  Insisting on a 
theory that the event C will always cause an event E, cannot be proved, it can 
be only empirically tested and based upon this expressed in a probability 
form.  According to the first supporters of this theory, C is then a probable 
cause of E, if, and only if the occurrence of C increases probability of 
occurrence of E. Following that Salmon adjusted this variant.  The reason 
was that unambiguously causal sequences of conditions exist, which occur 
with a smaller probability (e.g. exposure to radiation and a subsequent 
occurrence of leukemia, which is for example 5% probability), it is however 
provable, that such an occurrence is statistically higher in the case, when the 
even C (in this case exposure to radiation) really takes place (Salmon, 1998). 
 
Causal realism 
Positions of causal realism do not reduce causation to another relation 
than the causal relation, but they try to give a meaning to this relation.  They 
generally presume, that a real ontological relation of causation is reflected in 
the causal relation and therefore it is not a mere construct of thought, it 
cannot be reduced to a custom, as done by Hume, it even cannot be derived 
merely from the logical system of conditions.  According to this conception, 
the causal relation is scientifically objective and therefore it is possible to 
find an objective standpoint for its assessment.  This concerns neo-aristotle, 
or neo-thomistic theories, which create an alternative to a dominant 
regularity theories spectrum.  All come out of a conviction on the existence 




The so-called INUS („Insufficient but Necessary part of a set of 
conditions that is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient for the result”) theory was 
introduced by John Mackie, who modifies ideas of John Stuart Mill in his 
analysis (Mill, 2013).  Thus according to Mackie, the cause is insufficient, 
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however a necessary part of the condition, which is itself not necessary, 
however sufficient for the result (Mackie, 1980). At the same time, Mackie 
also introduced a notion of the so-called causal field (Mackie, 1965), when 
according to himsingular causal statements are always relative to a certain 
causal field. According to some authors, such as for example Michael 
Scriven, however the notion of cause as the INUS condition is in the case of 
Mackie again derived from the notions, which implicitly contain causation in 
them, even if it is hidden.  For the necessary and sufficient cause are terms, 
through which he created in the notion of causation a definition by 
“circulusvitiosus”. Similarly as Mill, Mackie also does not differentiate 
between circumstances of a phenomenon and a cause of this phenomenon.  
Particularly his theory does not function in some scientific fields, especially 
in the processes controlled by statistical laws (Losee, 2011). However it has 
its application in legal theory. 
 
Singular theory 
In 1926, Curt Ducasse drew attention to unfitness of all general 
conceptions of causation in common social discourse.  If we talk about 
causation, then according to Ducasse we do not want to search for scientific 
succession of conditions or constant conjunction, but we talk about single 
difference, which give rise to an effect.  Ducasse utilized some typical 
examples.  According to him, if a car engine fails, we do not ask about a 
sequence of events, we are merely interested in the difference between 
original circumstances, under which the engine operated, and the 
circumstances under which it does not operate.  Therefore, he defines as a 
cause a particular and unique change in the immediate environment, which 
occurred directly before occurrence of a particular effect in question. 
Ducasse distinguishes between assumptions, which are to explain laws and 
assumptions, which only explain a course of singular events, while the causal 
relation arises only between singular events, during the change between one 
condition and the other condition (Ducasse, 1941). The problem of a singular 
approach manifests itself in the fact that it is not possible to create a general 
theory, based upon which clear decisions could be made in individual cases. 
 
Causal pluralism 
Causal pluralism is then a theory, which holds that „causation is not 
the single kind of relation or connection between things in the world. 
Instead, the apparently simple and univocal term ´cause´ is seen as masking 
an underlying diversity” (Godfrey-Smith, 2009, p. 326). Thus causal 
pluralism uses more approaches to causation however it also refers to 
hermeneutic diversity of meanings, even if their name remains the same 
(Froeyman& De Vreese, 2008). Some authors then consider the conceptual 
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diversity of the notion of causation as the basic problem of the current 
philosophical, as well as scientific discourse (Godfrey-Smith, 2009), 
nonetheless others (Froeyman& De Vreese, 2008), on the contrary 
acknowledge advantages of the conceptual use of the term of causation. 
 
Modern approaches in legal theory 
Hans Kelsen –differentiation of factual causation and normative 
imputation 
An important turning point in understanding the relation of cause and 
effect in the legal order is brought by an approach of the Kelsen´s Pure 
Theory of Law. Kelsen comes from the Hume´s thesis, which in summary 
claims that a normative conclusion cannot be deduced from purely factual 
premises.  On the basis of this thesis Kant distinguishes two attitudes of 
human intellect, causal and normative (sein and soll, i.e. what “is” and what 
“ought” to be).  According to Kelsen, we can then talk about the principle of 
imputation in social sciences determining social law - this way it is possible 
to understand the conjunction between the hypothesis of a norm and 
sanctions as a result, unlike causation, which is present in natural sciences.  
The bond in causation is expressed by the modal verb "must", while on the 
legal (or moral) level the modal verb is the verb "ought". Similarly, in the 
normative system we talk about validity of rules, not about their existence.  
According to Kelsen: “Causality and imputation are, as being remarked, two 
different kinds of functional connection, two different ways in which two 
states of affairs can be connected together as condition and consequence. 
The difference between the two is this: imputation (i.e. the relation between a 
certain behaviour as condition and a sanction as consequence, described by 
a moral or legal law) is produced by an act of will whose meaning is a norm, 
while causality (i.e. the relation between cause and effect described by a 
natural law) is independent of any such intervention. Another difference is 
that every concrete cause has to be considered as the effect of some other 
cause, and every concrete effect as the cause of some other effect, and so — 
by the very nature of causality — the chain of cause and effect is endless in 
both directions. In the case of imputation, the situation is completely 
different. … A sequence of imputation does not have an unlimited number of 
elements, as a sequence of causality, but essentially only two elements" 
(Kelsen, 2000, p. 39). 
The theory of dualist concept was then manifested in differentiation 
of purely factual concept of causality interconnected with counterfactual 
form in the condition of conditio sine qua non and in the normative 
framework of imputation of a rule, where it manifests especially in a 
protective purpose of the rule, theory of adequate and immediate condition, 
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foreseeability of damage and other normative limitations of the scope of 
responsibility. 
 
Hart a Honoré – „common sense“ and “INUS system” 
In their publication of 1959  „Causation in the Law“  Hart and 
Honoré came from a methodological analysis of a common language and 
tried to prove that the concept of causation both in law, as well as in common 
language does not embrace one concept of causal conjunction, but more 
concepts. Thus, to a certain extent they point out that on the level of a 
pluralist concept of causation in the philosophical discourse however they 
rather presume, that the concept of causation in law does not reflect 
philosophical and scientific causation, but rather a common-sense notion of 
causation in an ordinary language.  According to them, this is exactly the 
concept relevant for actual application practice of courts, or as the case may 
be, for law-makers.  According to them, causation is more empiric than 
analytic or logical relation.  Hart a Honoré, similarly as Mackie, eventually 
utilize the INUS system of causation, even if there are some differences in 
their conception. At the same time, for legal discourse, they distinguish two 
models of statements „causing harm“, and „occasioning harm“, i.e. the 
model, which encompasses that one event (i.e. either human behavior, or an 
action) causes another (effect), or a model of the so-called interpersonal 
relationship between people, i.e. for example, when one person forces 
another to do something (instruction, aid, order, etc.) (Hart &Honoré 1985). 
 
Wright – NESS system 
Similarly as Hart and Honoré, Wright also comes from the concept, 
which focuses on the problems of a cause as a set of conditions.  At the same 
time he unambiguously asserts that causation is a factual concept, not the 
political or normative one.  In order to adjust his theory, he criticizes his 
predecessors for confusing inappropriately causal and non causal factors.  
Based upon this Wright asserts:  „We are not interested in all the possible 
causes, but only those that were tortious. This is the tortious-conduct 
inquiry. Policy considerations determine whether certain conduct will be 
treated as tortious. The second step, after the identification of tortious 
conduct which may have contributed to the injury, is the application of the 
actaul-causation requirement, which requires that the tortious conduct 
actually have contributed to the injury. This is the causal inquiry. At this 
stage it is irrelevant that there may also be other contributing factors 
(causes). …“  (Wright, 1985, p. 1774). Therefore Wright differentiates three 
steps in solving legal responsibility - firstly , exploration of other 
responsibility conditions, secondly, exploration of factual causation and 
thirdly, exploration of problems of immediate and adequate cause.  On the 
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basis of Hart and Honore´s ideas, Wright creates the NESS (Necessary 
Element of a Sufficient Set) test:  “…the NESS test states that a particular 
condition was a cause of a specific consequences if and only if it was 
necessary element of a set of antecedent actual conditions that was sufficient 
for the occurrence of the consequence” (Wright, 1985, p. 1774). 
 
Causation in practice - what problems we can face and how to deal with 
them 
Legal causation model should follow the solution of philosophical or 
scientific discourse. Unfortunately no consensus on the right sense of 
causation was reached.  Generally speaking there are three ways of defining 
causation. Monist theories exist, which refer to the fact that only one type of 
a causal relation exists, causal pluralists, who claim that more various 
relations can be covered under the notion of causal relation, however all of 
them fill a similar abstract model, therefore it is suitable to explore them 
under a unifying criterion of causation, and causal eliminativists (such as for 
example Russell), who claim that use of the word "causation in scientific 
approach could be replaced with another, more suitable construct.  In law, as 
a practical tool for materialization of relations in society, a bigger number of 
terms appear which are unified under the notion of causation. On the basis of 
a pragmatic test of utility, it is then suitable in individual causal theories to 
utilize their capacity for action in legal order, as all of these theories have 
their limitations (Losee, 2011). 
 
But for test (conditio sine qua non) 
In the law, as a primary element, the counterfactual theory is utilized, 
which is connected with the so-called "but for"test, or the conditio sine qua 
non, considered as a factual condition of causation (Koziol, 2007). This 
condition is expressed in the PETL principles in the Article 3:101 in the 
following manner: “An activity or conduct (hereafter: activity) is a cause of 
the victim’s damage if, in the absence of the activity, the damage would not 
have occurred.” There are numbers of obstacles connected with pure 
utilization of this formulation: 
The first consists in the problems of an infinite sequence of causes 
within the meaning of general causation, which must be limited in a certain 
manner.  In this case, the cause must be legally relevant, whereby we come 
from the factual judgment to the level of normative inference about 
subsumption of a given action under a criterion stipulated in the normative 
order.  Here, the limitations can be considered especially such normative 
criteria such as the protective purpose of the rule, adequacy and immediacy 
of a cause, interruption of a causal chain (mental causation), or foreseeability 
of damage.  The problem also consists in the fact that in a scientific sense, 
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we cannot talk about one cause, as this would not cause an effect in the 
absence of other conditions. 
The second consists in the cases of the so-called causal uncertainty, 
when it is not possible to give in evidence regarding a hundred per cent 
causal relation.  This problem is connected with the problems of multicausal 
damage and its proving in the case, when there is a causal uncertainty about 
whether a wrongdoer really caused the harm.  Typically, these are for 
example medical malpractice disputes, when we know the input action as 
well as the output in form of the current condition of the patient, but what 
lies between (causal nexus) is not completely clear (this is described as the 
so-called black box element).  For this reason, a number of opinions 
increases that in medical and legal disputes it would be more suitable to 
utilize other models, for example the mentioned theories of foreseeability 
and risk, or as the case may be compulsory liability insurance and the 
payment on the basis of strict liability, or settlement of the situation on the 
basis of the probabilistic theory (Bydlinsky, 2007) an utilization of the model 
of the causal proportional liability (Gilead, 2010), or possibly a model of 
partial liability (Koch, 2010). Possible recourse is also a remedy of turning 
the burden of proof, which can - in its essence - transform the purely factual 
causation into a non causal institute (Hart &Honoré, 2010). 
 The third problem is then connected with the problems of preemption 
causation and concurrent causation.  In the first case, we talk about such an 
action, which would lead to a certain effect, however it would not be 
overdeterminated by another action, which had caused the same effect 
before.  However, the result would occur only on the basis of the first action. 
Typical example:  D shoots and kills P just as P was about to drink a cup of 
tea that was poisoned by C.(Wright, 1985, p. 1775). In the second case we 
talk about such a situation, when it is not possible to make an objective 
conclusion, which event caused the effect, however at least one of these 
events had to cause the effect.  For example: C and D independently start 
separate fires, each of which would have been sufficient to destroy P´s 
house. The fires converge and together burn down the house.  Each fire was 
a duplicative cause of the destruction of the house (Wright, 1985, p. 1776). 
 The fourth problem comes into existence in connection with the 
damage caused on the basis of failure to act (in the so called 
omissivedelicts).  Eg. Moore does not consider the failure to act as an event 
(action), i.e. neither as an event (action) causing a contingent effect (Moore, 
2009).  The problem in the case of the counterfactual assessment of causal 
relation in connection with the failure to act is obvious for the reason that the 
failure to act consists in the absence of one particular action, even if there 
could be an infinite number of other acts.  Even here, deliberations are 
clearly filled with normative contemplation, when a causal relation is 
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expressed in a way that if A had not violated his duty resulting from the legal 
order, a harmful event would have not occurred. 
 
Protective purpose of a legal rule 
Out of the above mentioned reasons, non causal institutes are often 
used in legal practice, which are to ensure functionality of the conditio sine 
qua non test.  These institutes include other than a causal condition of 
attributability, therefore they have a normative character and their assertion 
is given on the basis of a political decision of the law-maker, or a judge.  In 
the European law, the non causal element limiting the causation is 
considered to be especially the protective purpose of a legal rule and 
subsequently an adequate or immediate cause and foreseeablity of infliction 
of damage.  The protective purpose of a rule results from the scope of this 
rule, out of its interpretation on the basis of traditional methods, in 
conjunction with its purpose, which consists in preventing the occurrence of 
damage.   We are able to infer legal responsibility merely in the context with 
this purpose.  This normative framework is described by the PETL principles 
in the article 3:201 Scope of liability. 
 
Adequate and immediate cause 
The theory of an adequate cause was formed in the German legal 
school, already at the end of the 19th century.  The probability method was 
utilized in legal theory by Von Kries.  He differentiated between the so-
called objective probability (Möglichkeit) and subjective probability 
(Wahrscheinlichkeit).  According to Von Kries, we can constitute the 
concept of objective causation as follows: "A given contingency will be the 
adequate cause of harm if and only if it satisfies two conditions: (i) it must be 
a sine qua non of the harm, (ii) it must have ´increased the objective 
probability´ of the harm by a significant amount“ (Hart &Honoré, 2010, p. 
5). The adequate cause theory serves for excluding improbable consequences 
from the tort liability.  This is again a non-causal tool for the limitation of 
imputation of a rule.  An immediate cause is usually also stated as a limiting 
tool, nevertheless  it is more appropriate to reflect an adequate cause than 
state an immediate cause, as it is quite possible that a cause is temporally 
immediate, however absolutely inadequate for a harmful event. 
 
Forseeability of causation of harm 
The institute of foreseeability of caused harm is laid down in many 
legal orders.  Its theory comes from a function of prediction, i.e. the 
possibility to see consequences of own acts.  Generally, the criterion of 
foreseeability can be assessed according to two criteria, a subjective, or 
objective one.  The subjective criterion considers a particular case, when a 
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particular individual could, or could not foresee effects.  The objective 
criterion consists in a general criterion of what can be expected with respect 
to a regular course of events and what can be expected as an effect of 
violation of a legal duty.  While the first criterion is firmly connected with 
another, traditionally necessary element in the responsibility scheme, with 
the fault, the other criterion is limiting vis-á-vis the wide causal 
understanding of a cause as a csqn condition. 
 
Conclusion 
Proposal of a solution 
Under current uncertainty about one definitive opinion on the concept 
of causation both on the general, as well as on the legal level, it is in our 
opinion the most suitable to come in law from a methodological approach 
introduced by Froeyman and De Vreese for natural sciences and everyday 
life, utilizing the conceptual analysis from the perspective of utility of causal 
schemes (the so-called "theoretical utility perspective“). This theory 
embodies a notion that the construction of causation should include both a 
sufficiently wide causal definition, which should be general to such an 
extent, so that it can embody diverse causal criteria of individual theories and 
at the same time it could then solve utilization for conceptually diverse 
situations and cases (Froeyman& de Vrees, 2008). 
 We consider this approach to be suitable especially out the following 
reasons: in the legal context unlike the scientific context, it is necessary to 
resolve pragmatically doubts about causal connection, as it is necessary to 
decide on an individual specific case (prohibition of denegatiojustitiae). In 
the scientific sense, research can be left without a clear decision, as cognition 
is not definite and moves on (Hulswit, 2013). Unless truth about causal 
connection is objectively established, or social consensus exists on what the 
causal connection is, it is possible to leave deliberation in the stage of 
research.  Thus the use of the conceptual analysis in a legal sense is suitable 
also for the reason that normative aspects and findings significantly intervene 
with deliberation.  At the same time a perspective of linguistic analysis of 
causal connection (Neeleman& van de Koot, 2012) is hereby accepted, 
which occurs in our verbal expressions (by the mere fact that often it is 
possible to distinguish direct and indirect causal connection in expressions, 
this being on the basis of different verbs (Wolff, 2003)). At the same time it 
is necessary not to forget the fact that in the law as a pragmatic tool for 
finding justice, quite often the so called legal fiction and legal assumptions 
are used as suitable. Their substantiation is then possible also in causation, as 
if we intuitively understand something as morally right and it is in 
accordance with general moral requirements, it would be then suitable to use 
a rule formulated in such a manner (from a pragmatic perspective) in the 
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legal regulations. The said conceptual method also makes it possible to work 
better and correct a potential inconsistency of the general causal approach by 
our moral intuition in individual pragmatic cases. The above mentioned 
methodological approach to causation (which will be called as a "pragmatic 
approach" for the purposes of this article), can be utilized on the basis of 
some paradigmatic models. 
 In what way should this method work? First, it is necessary to find a 
general clause, which will be sufficiently general, so that it can encompasses 
all cases of causal relations, even if it encompassed also non causal elements.  
Generally, it is possible to agree that causation is that what causes change, or 
diversity.  A general condition of causal relations is their irreflexivness and 
asymmetry (i.e. if A causes B, then B does not cause A, at the same time no 
causal loops can be achieved so if a → b and at the same time b →c then it is 
not true that c →a). Such a summary may not be valid in the natural 
causation however it is completely usable in the legal causation.  Hence, this 
general scheme can be always used in a causal model. 
 This should be a starting point for the legal analysis however such a 
summary apparently contains a big number of non causal relations. It would 
be at variance with moral intuition to derive responsibility from this general 
model. Therefore, it is necessary to utilize also other concepts of causation, 
which can be found in a theory and apply them to a specific case. 
 In the theory of civil law responsibility, the regular succession can be 
used, which admittedly does not have to be generally valid in the science 
however it can be always utilized on the legal level. The concept of 
spatiotemporally contiguity, i.e. the cause and its effect must be temporally 
and spatially connected, can be also used as a starting point.  These rules 
reflect regularity theories.  However, one of the starting points of legal 
responsibility is also the counterfactual theory embodied in the condition of 
conditio sine qua non. In connection with the test of csqn it is possible to use 
the procedure of elimination (i.e. the mental elimination of the action being 
assessed from the causal tests and ascertainment of a hypothetical effect, 
provided that the causal effect remains unchanged after taking out the action 
c from the causal chain, than  c is not a cause of e) and the procedure of 
substitution (in the case of failure to act, i.e. replacement of an illegal action 
with an action in compliance with legal regulations and by exploration, 
whether a harmful event would occur in such a case). 
 On the contrary the Wright´s NESS system can be applied in such 
cases, where the above mentioned csqncondition does not offer a correct 
solution (it is at variance with our intuitive conviction), i.e. in the case of 
multiplicity of sufficient causes.  In such a case the but for test fails, however 
the Wright´s NESS system can be used. The Wright´s NESS system is a 
useful tool for resolving causal issues associated with the so-called 
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concurrent causation and further to this in the case of competitive causation.  
However, it cannot be successfully applied in omissions, and in the case of 
the so-called asymmetrically ovedetermined concurrent-cause cases (Adams, 
2010). 
 With regard to the fact that legal deliberation on delicts must be 
always subordinated to normative framework of legal regulations, i.e to limit 
the range of causation to a specific spectrum of situations involving also the 
conditions stated in the protective purpose of the regulation and a method of 
its limitation, it is then possible to use the Hans Kelsen´s theory of 
imputation of legal standards.  This is usable also for the so-called 
omissivedelicts, as we attribute a particular effect to violation of duties on 
level of legal regulations. 
 Based upon an extended analysis for individual paradigmatic 
examples, it is then possible to create a pragmatic model of plural causation, 
which will be suitable for use in legal practice. 
 This outline of the method of causal pragmatism must be 
subsequently explored in line with moral intuition, which according to us can 
be explored on the basis of empiric studies and further to this in the context 
with individual areas, to which the law of tort relates.  For example, it is 
possible to state a situation in the medical and legal disputes, where the 
causal uncertainty about the causal relation being detected is high and we can 
talk about the so-called "black box" (Schiemann, 2007). Admittedly, in such 
a case the following models appear as adequate: the model of general 
causation, consisting in the change of an event, or state of affair (c → e is a 
causal relation, if, and only if on the basis of an event c  a change occurred 
with an effect of e or if a change of a state affair c  to a state affair e 
occurred), non identical relation (c → e is is a causal relation, if, and only if 
an event (state of affairs) c is not identical with an effect e) and the relation 
of asymmetry (c → e is a causal relation, if, and only if it is true that c 
causes  e, then it cannot be the case e causes c), further to this, also the 
following rules of time sequence (c → e is a causal relation, if, and only if 
an event type c (a cause) temporally precedes an event type e (an effect)) and 
spatial contiguity (c → e is a causal relation, if, and only if c a spatial 
contiguity with the type e (an effect)) can be used in the test of causation.  
However, the theory of regular succession (c → e is a causal relation, if, and 
only if e-type events regularly follow c-type events) is not usable in this case, 
as in the case of some disorder processes, only the singular approach to 
causation is adequate, therefore it is not possible to presume generally on the 
basis of type cases, identically as the theory of the counterfactual analysis (c 
→ e is a causal relation, if, and only if,  e is counterfactually dependent on 
c), as in this case, it cannot be explicitly said, whether the effect would occur 
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even without an illegal intervention of a doctor.  Therefore, in such a case the 
conditio sine qua non is not suitable and the insistency of some legal orders 
upon proving the causal relation with a hundred per cent certainty is 
indefensible and at variance with the corrective justice and thus also with the 
tort law principles.  Similarly, neither the Wright´s NESS test can be used as 
a model. However, it seems to be suitable to use the probabilistic theory (c 
→ e is a causal relation, if, and only if, c raises the probability of e), or as 
the case may be, the theory of statistical relevance (c → e is a causal 
relation, if, and only if, the occurrence of c is statistically relevant to the 
occurrence of  e), which currently found their practical models in some 
countries in the causal proportionate responsibility. 
 
Conclusion 
This whole article wants to draw attention to pluralism of causation 
theories not only in the scientific, but also in the legal and common 
language.  However, these familiar theories also found their application in 
the scientific field and in many cases specific methods for determination of a 
causal relation are often used in specific fields of science.  For this reason, 
we believe and we have tried to outline in this text that a starting point for 
the use of legal causation is the causal pluralism following from a pragmatic 
method of the most suitable effect for specific paradigmatic models of 
causation, i.e. its conceptual use.  This does not mean that we would give up 
an entitlement to real nature of causality, but we rather use the fact that law 
as a tool often utilizes intuitive irrefutable presumptions, which on the basis 
of their utility perform function of a practical tool.  Based upon the 
pragmatic method, it is then suitable to implement the causal methods 
dominating in the current discourse into the legal order, where the conditio 
sine qua non method appears to be inappropriate, or needs to be 
supplemented.  A rational analysis of such a test should be then performed 
on the basis of exploration, whether an action embodies relevant general 
elements of causal models.  Determination of such a theoretical framework 
presumes considerable efforts in reassessing  the so far practice, nevertheless 
the current solution to the problems of causal conjunction through the civilist 
doctrine,  but also the application practice of the Czech courts is not 
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